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Abstract: The review of the constitution emanates from the constitution, from the institute of constitutional review of which the 
latter is closely related to the dynamic processes in society as well as with the demand for sustainable stability, stability which 
very well it may be economic, political or social, national or international, the stability that affects even the constitutional order 
itself in a state. In this article, we will address the constitutional changes, the amendments over the years In Turkey and Russia 
which are 'proof' of the violation of the constitutional order, 'proof' of the impinging of democracy and stability in the country. 
Through this article, we will see that the constitutional system, rule of law, democracy or its consolidation, the stability in the 
country to a large extent are influenced by the way it is conducted the constitutional review process. The application or non-
application of this instrument has multi-dimensional effects, negative, destabilizing ones. 
  





The constitutional provisions, among others, aim to guarantee not only legal 
stability but also political, economic, and social stability, enabling stability 'for the 
society' of a certain country. In the constitutional provisions section of the normative 
text, a vital place is occupied by the provisions that regulate the amendment or review 
of the constitution. No part of a constitution is more important than the rules that 
regulate its amendment and the rules against its violation. The stability of the 
constitutional order affects the very stability of a country. In defense against the 
violation of the stability of the constitutional order, of stability in the country, various 
measures can and should be taken, where one of the measures taken to restore the 
stability of the constitutional order is the amendment or review of the constitution. 
It is impossible to draft an unchangeable constitution. It was Thomas Jefferson 
himself who said “Some men look at Constitutions with sanctimonious reverence, and 
deem them, like the Ark of the Covenant, too sacred to be touched. they ascribe to the 
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men of the preceding age a wisdom more than human and suppose what they did to be 
beyond amendment” (Google 2018). The constitution is generally presented as a 
dynamic act. The change, its review is the act that makes the constitution a dynamic and 
long-lasting act (Albert 2015). Changing the constitution in a dynamic society is a 
necessity. Dynamism is a vital phenomenon of everyday life that brings situations that 
need to be adjusted, changed, due to changing circumstances, ideas, or views. Stability 
in a country and constitutional order are often conditioned by active actions in function 
of new dynamics that force a change of the constitution.  
In this article, we will see how the institute of constitutional review can serve the 
political agenda of the leaders of a country, namely in Turkey. In this article, we will see 
how the undertaking of constitutional amendments in these two countries has brought 
instabilities not only to the constitutional system but also to these countries. In the 
interest of the research, we have used the following methods: the historical method, the 
sociological and legal method, the analytical method, and the case study method. 
In this article, we will address the constitutional changes, the amendments over 
the years which are 'proof' of the violation of the constitutional order, 'proof' of the 
impinging of democracy and stability in the country. Through this article, the 
'unannounced King', autocracy, the degradation of constitutionalism, killings, arrests, 
persecutions, are a 'very nice EUREKA' for me that I am digging for reality, for the truth, 
but the findings of this article are a bitter reality for the Turkey of nowadays. 
Some of the questions that will be answered in this article are, for Turkey: How 
democratic is an Assembly that undermines the concept of control and balance? How 
much political prudence does have the deputies of an Assembly that abolished the 
principle of separation of powers? Why can't the presidential system in Turkey be 
compared to the American system as Turkey has been trying to do to justify the 
amendments undertaken? To continue with the questions regarding Russia: Does the 
Constitution of the Russian Federation of 1993 represent the transition from autocracy 
or socialism to democracy or capitalism? Or it is more a well-written constitution but 
does not represent at all a change of ideologies? Did the overthrow of the old 
constitutional order in Russia brought about a radical change in the article or reality? 
Did „authoritarian‟ tendencies change with the adoption of the new constitution in 
Russia? Could or should the new „revolutionary‟ constitution prevent totalitarianism? 
 
TURKEY‟S CONSTITUTION OF 1982 
 
The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey has been in force for 38 years and has 
been amended 19 times over the years (Yazıcı 2017). The Constitution of the Republic of 
Turkey (hereinafter CRT) of 1982 has in its content the Preamble and 7 Parts with the 
respective Chapters and 177 articles. The table below gives a panorama of all the 
changes through the years of the CRT . The 1982 Constitution was drafted in an 
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atmosphere where it was the military that appointed the Constituent Assembly (Gönenç 
2008). The current constitution, which has been in force since 1982, essentially preserved 
the system of government formed by the Constitution of 1961, however, presidential 
powers and prerogatives were strengthened (Gönenç 2008). The Constitution of the 
Republic of Turkey since its adoption in 1982, as well as its amendments was far from 
the concept of constitutionalism. Arbitrariness, lack of control and balance, 
strengthening of one government power to the detriment of another government 
power, lack of rule of law (especially in the case of 'exploitation' of the declaration of a 
state of emergency, which was accompanied by the restriction of several rights) are 
characteristic of the CRT of 1982 or and its changes or reviews over time. 
The basic purpose of the constitution is to replace arbitrary reign with a 
government in which the rule of law is given priority and where the power is limited by 
various rules as well as by the legal and institutional mechanisms (Cos ̧kun 2013). To give 
a more concrete definition, constitutionalism “requires that the basic functions of the 
state be distributed among the various bodies and offices, that fundamental rights be 
recognized and constitutionally preserved, that governmental authority is subject to 
legal norms and that independent courts be established as a final guarantee for all the 
above requirements” (Cos ̧kun 2013, 96). The CRT of 1982 in its provisions since its 
adoption and throughout the changes over the years has protected the interests of the 
authoritarian state and not the rights of the individual. This is evident not only in the fact 
that a state of emergency is envisaged (as most states provide for it in their 
constitutions) but also in the way this provision is 'used' to restrict the rights of the 
individual in protecting the interests of those in power.  
The latest case is the declaration of a state of emergency, declared in July 2016 
and which continued until after June 2018 when the general elections were held. 
Turkey's 1982 constitution, which is in force, has failed to uphold the values of modern 
constitutionality. This especially considering the original text of the constitution, it can 
be said that: The governmental authority that drafted the Constitution of 1982 chose to 
protect the interest of the state instead of the individual, to privilege the authority of the 
state instead of individual freedoms. Consequently, the text of the constitution 
contained several declarations incompatible with the principles of democratic 
governance and the rule of law (Cos ̧kun 2013), which I have dealt with extensively below 
in recent amendments. 
The political situation in the country, the social and historical context, the political 
vision of the leaders of the time who are in power when the constitution is drafted or 
amended, affect the way a constitution is drafted, in the priorities set, and the rights 
protected. The rights guaranteed or limited in the constitution also show the level of 
democracy in that state, the fulfillment of the role of the state in a democracy, which 
among other things, is the regulation and guarantee of the rights of the individual. 
While in the CRT we can observe the opposite. It has often been observed that the 
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primary purpose of the Constitution of 1982 was to protect the state against the actions 
of its citizens, rather than to protect citizens from state violations , which are in fact what 
a democratic constitution, should do (Özbudun 2011). 
The restriction of human rights and freedoms, the low level of democracy, must 
be accompanied not only by criticism but also actions aimed at regulating or 
envisioning provisions that are in defense of the rule of law and democracy. The 
constitution received great criticism from all social groups as soon as it came into force, 
who expressed their demand for changes. Consequently, successive governments began 
to change the original text immediately after its adoption (Özbudun 2011). 
Despite the amendments adopted so far, the current CRT of 1982, especially with 
the last changes of 2017 has taken many steps back. There are changes concerning the 
rights provided in the original text of 1982, but the mechanism of protection or 
guarantee of these rights is in the will of an authoritarian state, where the 
implementation of the constitution and the rights recognized in the constitution are 
conditioned by the vision political power of the ruling party. This happened with the 
recent constitutional changes, where Erdogan's political vision was accompanied by the 
declaration of a state of emergency; with changes in the type of government, 
amendments that looked more like a new constitution than amendments to the current 
constitution. However, we must emphasize that the need and demand for a new 
constitution remains very current in Turkish society. There is no doubt that a new, 
democratic, and rights-based constitution will be a service to the country 's efforts to 
address the historical problems that transformed into chronic problems due to the 
continued delays in resolving these problems over the years (Özbudun 2011). Keeping in 
mind the infringement of democracy, the impinging of the constitutional order that the 
amendments of the year 2017 brought in Turkey we will elaborate in detail the 
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THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS OF  
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY IN 2017 
 
After decades of changes, with a new form of government, the CRT from 1982 is 
more like a new constitution. The CRT from 1982 has changed 14 times over the years 
(Table 1). 
 
Table 1. The review of the Constitution of Turkey through the years (review and changes in its Preamble, 




The latest constitutional amendments are those undertaken in 2017, amendments 
that laid the foundations to continue the anarchic and autocratic political vision of the 
leader of this country Coup d‟état (as labeled by President Erdogan), political crisis, state 
of emergency, thousands killed, hundreds of thousands arrested, other thousands of 
hundreds fired from work or persecuted, this is the panorama under which work began 
for 1) constitutional changes; 2) approval of these constitutional changes in the 
Assembly, and 3) approval of amendments by referendum. This was the ideal chaos to 
start implementing the totalitarian objectives, already enabled by the announcement 
and holding of general elections under the conditions of the state of emergency that 
was declared in July 2016 and continued until the June 2018 general elections. The 
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the emergency situation is associated with serious problems where there 
are 31 decrees taken under the state of emergency. These decrees are not 
subject to careful and effective consideration by parliament. These decrees 
are not subject to judicial review and none of them has been the subject of 
a decision by the Constitutional Court. These emergency decrees have 
particularly restricted certain civil and political rights, including freedom of 
expression, freedom of rally, and procedural rights. The following report 
shows that over 150,000 people were detained, 78,000 arrested and over 
110,000 civil servants fired (Turkey Report 2018).  
 
The Report goes on to describe the circumstances surrounding the referendum, 
which states: “In April 2017, Turkey held a referendum which approved the constitutional 
amendments by a narrow majority establishing a presidential system. The amendments 
were assessed by the Venice Commission as provisions that lack sufficient control and 
balance and endanger the principle of separation of powers between the executive and 
the judiciary. The referendum itself raised serious concerns about the overall negative 
impact of the state of emergency, the unequal ground of the 'game'" (Turkey Report 
2018) on both sides of the campaign, and ineffective safeguards for the integrity of the 
election. After reading this Report, after reading the constitutional amendments, some 
questions arise as follows: 
 Does the referendum hide the false democracy? 
 How democratic is an Assembly that undermines the concept of control and 
balance? 
 How much political prudence does have the deputies of an Assembly that 
abolishes the principle of separation of powers? 
 How can this presidential system be compared with the USA system, as some 
tried to do? 
 What is the content of these constitutional amendments that the Venice 
Commission openly opposes? 
 
The 2017 amendments relating to the neutrality of the judiciary; increasing the 
number of deputies from 550 to 600; criteria for parliamentary candidacy, to be elected 
deputy; holding elections every five years and at the same time for Parliament and the 
President; changes regarding the competencies and responsibilities of the Parliament; 
responsibilities related to the controlling authorities of the Parliament; election of the 
President; duties of the President; criminal liability of the President; Vice-Presidents and 
Ministries; repeat elections; state of emergency; repeal of Military Courts; High Council 
of Judges and Prosecutors; budget regulation; provisional article; the President who can 
be a member of the party and the deadline when the changes will be effective. 
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The Law no. 6771 on Constitutional Amendments contains 18 articles adopted by 
referendum, most of which entered into force after the elections for the Grand National 
Assembly of Turkey and the President (Council of Europe 2017) (out of 18 amendments 
3 have entered into force and we will tackle them below). The play with words begins in 
Article 1 of the constitutional amendments. 
Article 1 of the constitutional amendments regulates the change in Article 9 of 
the CRT where the word „impartial‟ is added after the word „independent‟. Is it not ironic 
that attention is paid to the adding of a word, while according to the following 
amendments we will see that the largest and the most important part of the Judiciary 
will be appointed by the President, the President who will continue to be a member of 
the political party legally? On one hand, it was added a word to Article 1 of the CRT and 
on the other hand, it was ruled out the principle of the separation of powers giving the 
President the right to appoint the major part of the Judiciary. 
Article 2 of the constitutional amendments regulates the amendment to Article 
75 of the Constitution, where the words 'five hundred and fifty are replaced by the 
words 'six hundred'. Article 3 of the constitutional amendments regulate the 
amendment to Article 76, where the words 'twenty-five' are replaced by the words 
'eighteen', in Paragraph I, and the words 'who have not performed compulsory military 
service' are replaced by the words 'who are performing military service', in Paragraph II 
of the same article. 
The constitutional amendments to Articles 2 and 3, are numbers, are calculated, 
are well calculated, and are part of the plan to pass constitutional amendments through 
the Assembly and the referendum. The promise that 50 deputies will be added is not an 
insignificant stimulus to guarantee a few more votes during the debates and discussions 
of the package of amendments. Reducing the age of the right to be elected is a lucrative 
proposal for two reasons: 
 It creates ambitious opportunities for aspiring young people, perhaps and rightly 
so, to be part of the Assembly at the age of 18 and more importantly; and 
 Exemption from compulsory military service is a very important constitutional 
promise for most young people who want to 'escape' military service. 
 
Article 4 of the constitutional amendments regulate the amendment to Article 77, 
where it specifies that: “The elections for the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and the 
Presidency of the Republic shall be held on the same day every five years; A deputy 
whose term of office expires is eligible for re-election; If the simple majority is not 
obtained in the first round of Presidential elections, the second round of voting is held 
according to procedure stated in Article 101”. According to this article now the election 
for the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and the Presidency of the Republic shall be 
held on the same day every five years. 
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Article 5 of the constitutional amendments regulates the amendment to Article 
87, which is amended as follows:  
The duties and powers of the Turkish Grand National Assembly are the 
adoption, amendment, and repeal of laws; debate and approve budget 
proposals and final accounts; decide on the currency and declare war; 
approve the ratification of international treaties, decide by a three-fifths 
majority of the Turkish Grand National Assembly to declare amnesty and 
pardon; and to exercise the powers and perform the duties provided for in 
other articles of the Constitution. 
 
Article 6 of the constitutional amendments regulates the amendment to Article 
98, which is amended as follows:  
The Turkish Grand National Assembly shall exercise its powers to obtain 
and supervise information through parliamentary inquiry, general debate, 
parliamentary inquiries, and written questions. A parliamentary inquiry is 
an audit conducted to obtain information on a specific topic; A general 
debate is the consideration of a specific topic related to the community 
and the activities of the state in the Plenary Session of the Turkish Grand 
National Assembly; A parliamentary inquiry is an inquiry for the Vice-
Presidents and Ministers conducted according to the fifth, sixth and 
seventh paragraphs of Article 106; A written question is a request for 
information addressed to the Vice Presidents and Ministers by the 
Members of Parliament to be answered in writing within fifteen days; The 
form of submission, content, and scope of motions and investigative 
procedures are regulated by the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly. 
 
According to the constitutional amendments of the above 2 articles (Articles 5 
and 6 of the CRT), the Turkish Grand National Assembly has been deprived of the 
previous constitutional right to monitor, control, call them for interpellation, conduct 
investigations or request a motion against the Cabinet and Ministers. 
With the amendments to Article 98, it is noticed a political movement to suppress 
and keep under wraps the Vice Presidents and Ministers. Can it be implied that in any 
case if Vice President or Ministers do not know how to surrender to the President, the 
first threatening and warning step is provided in Article 98 amended:  
A parliamentary inquiry is an inquiry for the Vice Presidents and Ministers 
conducted according to paragraphs five, six, and seven of Article 106. A 
written question is a request for information addressed to the Vice 
Presidents and Ministers by the deputies to be answered in writing within 
fifteen days. 
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Article 7 of the constitutional amendments regulate the amendment in Article 
101, where according to its content the fact that a person can be elected President of 
the Republic at most 2 times can be considered positive. The abolition of the obligation 
of the elected President to sever political relations with the Party to which he belongs is 
an open violation of the principle of the President's impartiality. Article 8 of the 
constitutional amendments regulates the amendment to Article 104 where “executive 
power belongs to the President”. With the new changes, there will be no Prime Minister. 
The President will appoint and dismiss the Vice Presidents, Ministers, Senior State 
Officials, Ambassadors, and foreign representatives, ratifies and promulgates 
international treaties, holds referendums, etc. 
Strengthening the position of President not only limits the role of the Grand 
National Assembly of Turkey but risks having an autocrat as President who has power 
over the judiciary (in appointments and dismissals of the most important institutions), 
over the executive (which he leads, in appointments and dismissals) over the legislature 
(which has a very limited power). 
Article 9 of the constitutional amendments regulates the amendment to Article 
105, on the indictment, investigation, and trial of a case against the President. 1) An 
indictment can be filed against the President before parliament with a motion accepted 
by an absolute majority of deputies (301 deputies‟ pro). 2) The investigation can start 
only if 3/5 of the total number of the Grand National Assembly votes in favor (360 
deputies‟ pro). 3) For the case to be sent, if it is considered reasonable, to the Supreme 
Court, it must have the vote in favor of 2/3 of the total number of the Grand National 
Assembly voting in favor (400 deputies in favor). For the autocrat, the importance of 
political, dependent institutions is as great as that of constitutional amendments. The 
inviolability of the autocrat is certain because according to the Constitution the majority 
required to send the case to the Supreme Court is a majority required for amendments 
to the Constitution. 
The constitutional amendments to Article 10, which regulates Article 106 of the 
Constitution, contradict the statement that the American presidential system is being 
'imitated', to empower the state, its economic empowerment. According to the 
Constitution of the United States of America, the President and the Vice President, both 
of them, are subject to election by the electorate. According to the amendments 
regulating Article 106 of the Constitution the Vice President in Turkey will be appointed 
by the President after the election. In the USA, the Vice President takes the place of the 
President, while in Turkey the elections for the new President (in case of a vacancy) must 
be held within 45 days. You cannot justify undemocratic reforms, constitutional 
amendments hiding behind examples of other countries that one pretends to imitate. 
Article 11 of the constitutional amendments regulates the amendment to Article 
116, where among others specifies that:  
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The Grand National Assembly may decide to renew elections with a three-
fifths majority of the total number of members. In this case, the general 
election of the Grand National Assembly and presidential elections shall be 
held together. If the President of the Republic decides to renew the 
elections, the general election of the Grand National Assembly and 
presidential elections shall be held together.  
 
Again here we see the tendency of control and the important role that the 
unclaimed „King‟, the President will have over the decision to renew the elections. Article 
12 of the constitutional amendments regulates the amendment to Article 119 
recognizing the exclusive right of the President to declare a state of emergency, whereas 
previously this was the right of the Council of Ministers. Constitutional restrictions 
during a state of emergency are known. The state of emergency was used to hold the 
referendum on the 2017 constitutional changes, and it was used to hold the general 
elections in June 2018. 
The constitutional amendments to Article 13 that regulate Article 142 of the 
Constitution provide for the Repeal of the Military Courts - where this is one of the 
amendments that entered into force with the adoption of the referendum. 
The constitutional amendments of Article 14 regulating Article 159 regulate the 
reform of the High Judicial Council and Prosecutors; wherein some key appointments of 
higher judicial instances the President of the Republic will have its role. 
Article 15 of the constitutional amendments regulates the amendment to Article 
161 related to the budget and final accounts. This amendment added 8 paragraphs to 
Article 161 of the CRT. This article regulates the timing of the submission by the central 
government of the budget bill to the Grand National Assembly, what happens in case 
the budget law cannot be put into force in time. 
Article 16 of the constitutional amendments regulates changes, adjustments, 
removal, and addition of words to various articles of the Constitution. Among the 
changes included in this article, it is worth mentioning the „innovation of 3 government 
powers in 1‟, (being ironic here) - where the President is given the right to appoint 13 of 
the 15 members of the Constitutional Court. Constitutional changes are now even safer 
in the hands of the President! 
The constitutional amendments of Article 17, which contain provisional 
provisions, regulate the entry into force of some constitutional amendments. Among the 
provisional provisions worth mentioning is the setting of the date for the elections of 
the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and the President. The date set for holding 
these elections was 03 November 2019. But the current leader, as an experienced 
strategist for his visionary autocracy, had to take advantage of the state of emergency. 
The transitional provision has already been violated; the election date was set for 
June 24, 2018. In violation of the constitutional provision where the election date was 
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November 3, 2019, and the new election date was set on June 24, 2018. The Parliament 
is not and will not be strong enough to investigate and impeach a President that 
violates the Constitution as it proved so after the violation of this article of CRT. 
Article 18 of the constitutional amendments regulates the time of entry into force 
of the constitutional amendments approved by the 2017 referendum. 
Turkey's hidden agenda has been revealed but the path or consequences of this 
hidden agenda cover many secrets and unknowns that we still do not know. What we do 
know is that the democracy has been violated, the principle of the separation of powers 
has been infringed, the constitutional order is in danger as are the people of Turkey that 
want a country ruled by rule of law and democratic values. 
 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION FROM 1993 
 
The end of the 80s, the beginning of the 90s coincides with the time of 
revolutions, changes in the 'bloc' of Eastern Europe, including Russia. It was the time of 
revolution, great upheavals, and radical changes in the political, social, and economic 
order. The path from authoritarianism to democracy (however fragile and transitional 
the latter may have been), was accompanied by revolution, the overthrow of the existing 
order, and the establishment of a new order characterized by pluralism, separation of 
powers, the guarantee of rights, and freedoms basic of the individual. In response to a 
growing economic crisis and the separatist movement from the Republics, the Politic 
Bureau sought to restore the dominance of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 
the legislative process (Chauvin 1994). The failure of the conservative coup of August 
1991 showed that there could be no withdrawal without bloodshed from a state in 
which legitimacy stems from the people, not from a political party or a faction (Chauvin 
1994). President Boris Yeltsin, when faced with a situation that paralleled the 1917 
revolution, chose to support a peaceful transition to a free society, rather than gaining 
approval with bullets (Chauvin 1994).  
The driving force that helped the revolutionary initiative that brought radical 
change was not one, but several. These driving forces in Russia led to deep social, 
political, parliamentary, and constitutional crises in the country. The old politics was 
trying to resist change but time showed that it was impossible to withstand the 
„pressure‟ exerted by the driving forces of that time. It was impossible to resist the 
driving forces, it was difficult to fight and win with the time factor, the social factor, the 
political factor, the economic factor, the international factor.  
These driving forces these factors dictated the necessity of overthrowing the 
existing social, political, economic, constitutional order. Despite the efforts of the then 
leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, for economic recovery, this not only failed, but months later 
the economic situation deteriorated (Look; Mannheimer 2008). Despite this, Gorbachev 
began to liberalize the political climate, allowing criticism of the government, and in this 
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context, undertook changes to the text of the constitution to achieve this goal (Look; 
Mannheimer 2008). The transformation of the state had begun a process of 
transformation of the constitution. The old constitution had been changed more than 
three hundred times (Krylova 2015). It was full of contradictions. It was completely clear 
that the new government needed a new constitution (Krylova 2015). The old 
constitutional cycle would be replaced by a cycle, a new constitutional process. The 
action of internal and external forces, of the national and international factor, was 
accompanied by the necessity of overthrowing the existing constitutional order and the 
birth and development of an order that would resolve the existing revolutionary 
contradictions that would bring radical changes in statehood, in government, as well as 
in constitution-making process. 
The ground for drafting and approving a new constitution was ready. And in 1993 
the new constitution was approved. But naturally, questions arise: Did the overthrow of 
the old constitutional order in Russia bring about a radical change only on the article or 
even in reality? Did „authoritarian‟ tendencies change with the adoption of the new 
constitution in Russia? Could or should the new „revolutionary‟ Constitution prevent 
totalitarianism? To answer these questions, I will rely a little on Montesquieu and writing 
by Chauvin.  
In Russia, on the other hand, fabrications of the power of the Communist Party of 
the Soviet Union have penetrated every inch of Russian life, demanding the creation of a 
completely new system of government (Chauvin 1994). If a “revolution destroys the 
models of a systematic government, but the model of systematic thinking that produced 
this government has remained intact, then those models will be repeated in the next 
government” (Chauvin 1994). Montesquieu‟s words are perfectly fitting for all 
authoritarian rulers throughout the history of Russia and the Soviet Union; "All the blows 
were against tyrants, none against tyranny” (Chauvin 1994). 
The Constitution of the Russian Federation of 1993 had its point of support. The 
Constitution of the Fifth French Republic served as one of the most important models 
for drafting the Constitution of Russia in 1993 (Schmid 2010). The Constitution of the 
Russian Federation was adopted by National Referendum on December 12, 1993, and 
entered into force on December 25, 1993 (Amended in 1996, 2001, 2008, 2014). The 
Constitution of the Russian Federation has 137 articles, the Preamble, and two parts. 
 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS TO  
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION FROM 1993 
 
The timing of the drafting and approval of a constitution also affects the details, 
the regulations provided for the institute for the review of the constitution. The review 
of the Constitution of the Russian Federation (hereinafter CRF) is regulated in Articles 71 
(letter a); 92 (paragraph 3); 134-137. The changes in the CRF from 1993 to 2008 were 
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not substantial; they did not bring major changes in the constitutional system (Graph 1). 
These changes have had more to do with the constituent units of the Russian 
Federation, with correction or adjustment of terms based on changes made by federal 
constitutional laws. According to the content of CRF, the essential changes are 
ascertained in 2008 that had to do with the extension of the mandate of the President 
and the State Duma as well as the establishment of the obligation of the Government to 




Graph 1. The review of the Constitution of the Russian Federation through the years (22 articles in total) 






Graph 2. The review of the Constitution of the Russian Federation through the years in percentage  
(Source: own study) 




Number of articles amended through the years in the 
Constitution of the Russian Federation of 1993








Number of Articles in % amended through the years of the Constitution of 
Russian Federation of 1993
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs | Vol. 7, No. 2, 2021 | eISSN 1857-9760 
Published online by the Institute for Research and European Studies at www.e-jlia.com      
     
 
                                            
 56 
The stability of the legal system in a country, the stability of the constitution is 
conditioned by its role and its activity to guarantee the protection of the constitutional 
order and the implementation of its constitution. Guaranteeing the stability of the 
constitution is the type of procedure applied for constitutional review and amendment. 
The „rigidity‟ of the CRF with its two separate methods of change shows that it is not a 
guarantee to protect the constitution. The stability of the constitution is guaranteed not 
only by the rigidity of the amendment procedures, its review process but also by the 
implementation of the provisions provided in it. Russia has a "rate of change of articles 
below average” (Fruhstorfer 2017), between all Central and Eastern European countries 
(Fruhstorfer 2017). But the effect is not a "preservation" of the political system 
(Fruhstorfer 2017). Rather, we can observe the frightening Russian practice of changing 
the constitution through organic law (Fruhstorfer 2017). Petersen and Levin describe this 
as “de facto changes that take place outside or under the constitution” (Fruhstorfer 
2017).  
Recognizing the reality of the last 25 years in Russia, comparing this reality with 
137 articles of the CRF, I say that the amendments to the CRF give us an overview of the 
applicability of the implementation of the CRF, show us the ease of undertaking major 
changes even if we are talking about a rigid constitution. The provisions to amend or to 
review the CRF failed to impede the fulfillment of the autocratic vision of the President's 
figure. The 'protectors' and 'guarantors' of the CRF with the amendments in the CRF, 
although in a rigid constitution found their way to it: 
 Established the „autocracy‟ from where an individual „could‟ be, until now 14 + 6 
= 20 years President of Russia (Article 81/1); - Vladimir Putin, the 20-year-old 
President, who managed to get 4 presidential terms, (2000-2008) (2012-2018) 
and (2018-2024); 
 Strengthen the control of the President in the legislative power by increasing the 
powers regarding the appointments and dismissals of the representatives of the 
Federation Council (Article 83/e); 
 Strengthen the role and control of the President in the judiciary system through 
the proposal for appointment and dismissal to the Federation Council of the 
Prosecutor General and his deputies, as well as the President's exclusive right to 
appoint and dismiss public prosecutors of the constituent units of the Russian 
Federation, as well as prosecutors, except public prosecutors of cities, districts 
(Article 83/f); - Also the President has the constitutional right to appoint and 
dismiss them; 
 Extend the mandate of the State Duma from 4 years to 5 years, which can be 
interpreted as a 'reward' on the one hand to facilitate the adoption of the 
constitutional amendment of the President's mandate and on the other hand a 
'gift' to the institution that historically dominated by the ruling government party 
(Article 96/1); 
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 Merged and „unite‟ the High Court of Arbitration (Articles 102/g; 102/h; 126; 127; 
128/3); 
 Extend the jurisdiction of the State Duma, strengthening the State Duma's control 
function over the Government. This expansion at best can be interpreted as 
strengthening the legislative power, but at worst and more realistically it can be 
interpreted as further strengthening the position of the President. Why? How? 
Does not the President dissolve the State Duma? The President keeps the State 
Duma under pressure, the latter keeps the government under pressure, for the 
President (Articles 103/c; 114/1/a); 
 Politicizing the Constitutional Court? The decision of the Constitutional Court of 
16 June 1998. Nr. 19-P “On the interpretation of certain provisions of Articles 125, 
126 and 127 of the CRF” (Vereshchagin 2015), the Constitutional Court declared 
that the laws should be uniform and that contradictory interpretations of 
constitutional norms by different courts are inadmissible. 
 
One of the reasons for the review of the constitution is or should be the 
preservation or establishment of stability in the country. The review of the CRF of 2008 
had a destabilizing role in the country. The changes in the CRF of 1993 did not come as 
a result of the instability of the constitutional system, of any crisis or transition period in 
Russia. These amendments, I mean the fundamental amendments, have taken place to 
implement the agenda of political will represented by the current President. The 





In the Republic of Turkey and the Russian Federation as well, the constitutional 
amendments provide us with an overview of how constitutional amendments can be 
turned into a means of implementing the „agenda‟ of its political leaders. Substantial 
amendments in their constitutions of these two countries have come so that to 
implement the political will agenda represented by the current Presidents. Changes in 
the CRT and the CRF have gradually legitimized the visionary revolution for autocratic 
power. 
In Turkey, the constitutional amendments bring the transition from a 
parliamentary system to a presidential system, where the President is given a range of 
powers that have transformed the President into a formally unannounced „monarch‟. 
Through the amendments undertaken and approved, Turkey has started a new stage 
where democracy has been shaken, autocracy has paved its way, constitutionalism has 
been hit, the three powers have been concentrated in the hands of a single person and 
all this is legitimized by the constitution and laws. 
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In Russia, under the word democracy and for democracy or under the slogan for 
the people and with the people, constitutional changes that were undertaken do not 
represent the people, do not represent the values that this nation embraces. The 
amendments in this country represented the hidden political interests and agendas and 
not the interests of the people. 
Nowadays, dictatorship, authoritarianism, totalitarianism have reduced the 
degree of democracy during and through the process of constitutional amendments, as 
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10. Özbudun, Ergun, 2011. Turkey‟s Constitutional Reform and the 2010 
Constitutional Referendum, Mediterranean Politics | Turkey, 2011, p. 191, 
https://www.iemed.org/observatori-en/arees-danalisi/arxius-
adjunts/anuari/med.2011/Ozbudun_en.pdf 
11. Turkey 2018 Report, 2018. European Commission, Commission Staff Working 
Document, Strasbourg, 17.4.2018 SWD (2018) 153 final, 
https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/20180417-
turkey-report.pdf  
12. Schmid, Ulrich, 2010. Constitution and narrative: peculiarities of rhetoric and 
genre in the foundational laws of the USSR and the Russian Federation, Studies in 
East European Thought, 2010, p. 446, 
https://www.alexandria.unisg.ch/69970/1/2010_Schmid_Constitutions.pdf 
Vereshchagin, Alexander, 2007. Judicial Law-Making in Post-Soviet Russia, 
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs | Vol. 7, No. 2, 2021 | eISSN 1857-9760 
Published online by the Institute for Research and European Studies at www.e-jlia.com      
     
 
                                            
 60 
Routledge-Cavendish. 
13. Yazıcı, Serap, 2017. Constitutional Amendments of 2017: Transition to 
Presidentialism in Turkey, GlobaLex, 
https://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/2017_Turkey_Constitution_Amendments.
html 
 
 
 
 
